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THE WAGES OF TAKING BAKKE SERIOUSLY: 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE PUBLIC 
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS PROCESS 
Martin D. Carcieri' 
In the Beginning, there was Bakke.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
University of California Regents v. Bakk/ remains a con-
troversial decision. In Bakke, the UC Davis Medical School had 
set aside up to 16 out of 100 seats in every entering class solely 
for members of certain racial or ethnic minority groups. In his 
controlling opinion, Justice Lewis Powell ruled that while such 
a quota system violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment, race and ethnicity may be used as "one element in 
a range of factors"2 in determining admission. 
Whatever else may be said of Justice Powell's opinion, it is 
arguably consistent as a matter of political theory: the two key 
principles on which he rested his decision, and with which he 
instructed public universities to accommodate, embody quin-
tessential liberal values. On the one hand, he was clear that for 
several reasons it is the individual, not groups, who holds civil 
rights such as equal protection.3 On the other hand, he ruled 
that the promotion of diversity among the student body at pub-
lic universities is a compelling state interest. 4 Through the 
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Florida, Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. J.D., Ph.D., University of California. I wish 
to thank UNF General Counsel Karen Stone for her useful comments. 
** Law School Admission Council, New Models to Assure Diversity, Fairness, and Ap-
propriate Test Use in Law School Admissions (December 1999), at 5. 
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
2. !d. at 314. 
3. !d. at 289-99. On individualism as a liberal value, see Paul Brest & Miranda 
Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 861-62 (1995); Martin D. 
Carcieri, The Wages of Taking Bakke Seriously: The Untenable Denial of the Primacy of 
the Individual, (forthcoming in the TENN. L. REV.). 
4. See 438 U.S. at 311-12. On diversity as a liberal value, Mill, one ofliberalism's 
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"whole person"5 approach, accordingly, Powell sought to allow 
universities to advance educational diversity while avoiding an 
undue burden on individuals whose immutable traits do not 
earn them a preference. Both of these objectives could be ad-
vanced by the use of race/ethnicity simply as a tiebreaker to 
"tip the balance"6 in close cases. 
The Powell opinion has been criticized,7 and it is not clear 
that educational diversity remains a compelling state interest, 
if it ever truly was.8 Nonetheless, the ruling arguably consti-
tutes a reasonable compromise between basic, conflicting lib-
great prophets, wrote that a liberal education is 
[D]irected ... to a broad development of understanding over the widest pos-
sible area of knowledge; ... it is an education concerned not so much with 
factual acquisition as with the quality of experience, with truth, not dogma, 
with discovery in intellectual exploration and the release of individual poten-
tial. 
F. W. GARFORTH, JOHN STUART MILL ON EDUCATION 18 (1971). When properly admin-
istered, diversity encourages toleration, a related liberal value. See e.g., CHRISTOPHER 
ED LEY, NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 130, 141 (1996); Deborah C. Malamud, Race, Cul-
ture, and the Law: Values, Symbols and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1691 (1997). 
There are, however, serious problems with the diversity rationale. One is the 
lack of a coherent definition of the diversity in which there is a compelling state inter-
est. Whatever that definition may be, if there is one, a second, related difficulty is the 
dubious claim that universities are truly committed to the promotion of diversity. See, 
e.g., Timothy Hall, Educational Diversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 
551 (1998); Carl Cohen, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Preference by Race in 
University Admissions and the Quest for Diversity, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 
43 (1998); Scott L. Olson, The Case Against Affirmative Action in the Admissions Proc-
ess, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 991 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, Religion 
as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059 (1996). Even putting these problems aside, further, 
the link between race preferences and the promotion of the state interest is a source of 
difficulty. See, e.g., Corinne E. Anderson, A Current Perspective: The Erosion of A( 
firmatiue Action in University Admissions, 32 AKRON L. REV. 181, 228 (1999); Jim 
Chen, Is Affirmative Action Fair? Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary The-
ory and Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 811, 814 (1998). Even some pro-
ponents of affirmative action concede this. As Bowen and Bok observe, for example, ·'it 
would be an oversimplification to assume that all African Americans ... represent any-
thing resembling one point of view." WILLIAM G. BOWEN AND DEREK BOK, THE Sl!APE 
OF TI-lE RIVER 219 (1998). 
5. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Symposium on Affirmative Ac-
tion: Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1751 (1996). 
6. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. 
7. See e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996); Lino A. Graglia, 
Professor Loewy's "Diversity" Defense of Racial Preference: Defining Discrimination 
Away, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1509-11 (1999); Hall, supra note 4 at 592. 
8. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45; Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795-800 
(1st Cir. 1998); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schools, 197 F.3d 123, 130 (4th 
Cir. 1999). 
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eral values and is still widely admired over twenty years after 
it was handed down. 9 Accordingly, a basic premise of this arti-
cle is that Justice Powell's opinion should be faithfully en-
forced. In spite of its problems, Bakke should be taken seri-
ously. 
Interestingly, there is a narrative among affirmative action 
proponents that Bakke has been taken seriously, that public 
universities have routinely followed the ruling in practice. Pro-
fessor Olivas, for example, assures us that only "modest racial 
criteria"10 are presently used in admissions decisions since "no 
law school can afford to admit students who cannot do the 
work."11 Thus, add Amar and Katyal, "diversity has a built-in 
stopping point, an inherent limit on the amount of permissible 
affirmative action."12 As Bowen and Bok explain, universities 
are unlikely to overreach because "[t]he admissions practices of 
colleges and professional schools are highly visible .... Life in 
such settings has been described by using the analogy of the 
fishbowl."13 Finally, Dworkin assures us, faculty and academic 
administrators are trustworthy since they "are in no way be-
holden for power or financial suBpart to any of the communities 
[that race preferences] benefit." 4 
II. THE PROBLEM: BAKKE HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY 
Notwithstanding such rhetoric, it is now well documented 
that Bakke has not been taken seriously. Race/ethnicity has be-
come not simply one of many factors given equal weight in de-
9. As Olivas notes, "[T]he carefully nuanced Powell opinion has proven surpris-
ingly resilient and supple over the two decades since" it was handed down. Michael A. 
Olivas, The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Educa· 
tion, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1121 (1997). As Bloom adds, "Powell got it right in 
Bakke, and ... his approach should be reaffirmed on the merits and not simply on the 
basis of stare decisis." Lino A. Bloom, Hopwood, Bakke, and the Future of" thf Diversity 
Justification, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 65 (1998). See also Samuel Issacharoff, Bakke in 
the Admissions Office and the Courts: Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 669, 693-94 (1998); ROBERT POST, Introduction: After Bakke, RACE AND 
REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 13, 20 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 
1998). 
10. Olivas, supra note 9, at 1092. 
11. !d. at 1119. 
12. Amar and Katyal, supra note 5, at 1776-77. 
13. BOWEN AND BOK, supra note 4, at 286-87. 
14. Ronald Dworkin, Affirming Affirmative Action, NY REVIEW OF BOOK.S, Octo-
ber 22, 1998, at 91, 101 (book review). 
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terming admission to selective public universities, but rather 
the main factor. In Hopwood v. Texas, for example, the Univer-
sity of Texas law school was proven to have placed far more re-
liance on African American or Hispanic ancestry than allowed 
under Bakke. As the Fifth Circuit observed: 
[T]he law school ran a segregated application evaluation proc-
ess. Upon receiving an application form, the school color coded 
it according to race. If a candidate failed to designate his race, 
he was presumed to be in a nonpreferential category. Thus, 
race was always an overt part of the review of any applicant's 
file.ls 
For many years, similar procedures were used at the Uni-
versity of California. In 1995, the year before Proposition 20916 
was enacted, the gap between the SAT scores of Caucasians 
and Asians accepted to UCLA and UC Berkele~ and those of 
Afro-Americans and Hispanics was 250 points. 7 This leaves 
little doubt that race and ethnicity were relied on far more 
than simply to "tip the balance" in close cases. 
Such practices have also long been used at the University of 
Michigan, where equal protection challenges to the admissions 
processes at the undergraduate and law schools are currently 
pending. 1R In 1995, for example, Lerner and Nagai reported a 
230 point gap between the median SAT scores of successful 
Caucasian and Afro-American applicants and a 130 point gap 
between the median SAT scores of successful Caucasian and 
Hispanic applicants to Michigan's undergraduate program. 1 ~ 
15. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932, 937 (1996). See also, Robert D. Alt, Toward Equal Pro· 
tection: A Review of Affirmative Action, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 179, 191 n. 80 (19971 (as Alt 
elaborates, "it [was] presumed that other institutions run similar programs, since ex-
pert testimony professed to that very fact in an attempt to vindicate the University of 
Texas ... The Fifth Circuit was unimpressed with the 'but everybody's doing it' de-
fense."). See also, Gaglia, supra note 7, at 1513-16. 
16. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. 
17. See Michael W. Lynch, Affirmative Action at the University of Califbrnia, 11 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, 139, 148 (1997); STEPHAN THERNSTOM & 
ABIGAILTHERNSTOM, AMERICAN IN BLACK AND WHITE 408 Tbl. 9 (1997). As Lerner and 
Nagai observe of the 1995 UC Berkeley admissions statistics, "(t)he highest quartile, or 
75th percentile score for African Americans is almost equal to the lowest quartile, or 
25th percentile score for whites and Asian Americans." Robert Lerner & Althea K. Na-
gai, Affirmative Action in Undergraduate Education: The University of California 
Berkeley, 1993-1995: A Preliminary Report (visited Oct. 9, 1996) 
<http://www.ceousa.org/htmllberkeley.htmi>. 
18. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E. D. Mich. 1998); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
188 F.3d 394 (6'h Cir. 1999). 
19. As Michigan professor Carl Cohen adds, "[i]n a system in which one point is 
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In response to such disclosures, Bowen has insisted that 
"(c)learly the decisions are not based on race alone."20 Such a 
reply, however, simply avoids the point. No one claims that 
given for an applicant's outstanding essay, 1 point is given for an applicant's exhibition 
of state-wide leadership and service, and an applicant with an SAT score of 1600 re-
ceives 6 points more than an applicant with an SAT scores (sic) of 930, every applicant 
with 'Underrepresented RaciaVEthnic Minority Identification' gets 20 additional 
points." Cohen, supra note 4, at n.43 (reporting data from the Selection Index Work-
sheet of the University of Michigan Office of Undergraduate Admissions). See also, 
Bloom, supra note 9, at 66, n.535; Alt, supra note 14, at 192. 
Lerner and Nagai have also documented similar processes, in which race and 
ethnicity have been used well out of proportion to the limited permission granted in 
Bakke, at other selective public universities. See, e.g., Robert Lerner & Althea K. Na-
gai, Preferences in North Carolina Higher Education (visited Sept. 11, 2000) 
<http://www.ceousa.org/html/nc.htmi> (190 point SAT gap between successful Black 
and white applicants at UNC Chapel Hill in 1995); Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, 
Preferences at the University of Virginia: Racial and Ethnic Preferences in Under-
graduate Admissions, 1996 and 1999, (visited Sept. 11, 2000) 
<http://www.ceousa.org/html/va2.htmb (190 point black/white SAT gap at lN in 1999); 
Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Affirmative Action in Colorado Higher Education, 
<www.ceousa.org/htmllcolorado.htmi> (visited Sept. 11, 2000) (205 point black/white 
SAT gap at CU Boulder in 1995); Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Preferences in 
Washington Higher Education (visited Sept. 11, 2000) 
<http://www.ceousa.org/html/warp.htmb (220 point black/white SAT gap at the Uni-
versity of Washington in 1995). 
Further, since the dominant use of race and ethnicity has filtered into ele-
mentary and high school admissions and transfer practices as well, there have now 
been successful equal protection challenges at those levels. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Git-
tens, 160 F. 3d 790 (1998); Eisenberg ex. rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County, 197 F. 
3d 123 (1999). See generally, Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Themstrom, Race Prefer-
ences: What We Now Know, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1999, at 44. 
These developments should come as no surprise. First, this dynamic has 
taken place in other public contexts in which race/ethnicity was originally conceived as 
but "one factor among many" in the allocation of scarce, valuable public benefits. As 
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, the centrist bloc on whom the future of public affirma-
tive action arguably rests, have observed of the broadcasting license context, "race is 
clearly the dispositive factor in a substantial number of comparative proceedings." 
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1989) (5-4 decision) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Second, the color coded application process is well established at selective pri-
vate universities. As the Thernstroms observe of Bok and Bowen's own figures: 
[A]among 1989 applicants to the five private schools studied intensively by 
Bowen and Bok, only 19 percent of whites with combined SAT scores from 
1200 to 1249 were admitted, as against 60 percent of blacks with similar 
scores; in the next bracket up (1250-1299), 24 percent of whites but 75 per-
cent of blacks were accepted. In these two brackets, then, the black accep-
tance rate was triple that for whites .... [In other words], black applicants 
with scores around 1200 were nearly as likely to be accepted at Bowen and 
Bok's five institutions as whites with scores of 1500 or better. 
Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra, at 45-46 (responding to BoK & BOWEN, supra note 
4). 
20. Quoting Ethan Bronner, Conservatives Open Drive Against Affirmative Action, 
N. Y.TIMES, January 26, 1999, at A10. 
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race/ethnicity is the only factor determining admission to top 
public universities, for then we might expect to find illiterates 
at Berkeley and Michigan. The problem is rather that 
race/ethnicity has become the predominant factor in these 
processes, 21 and this is flatly inconsistent with the Bakke "one 
of many factors" rule. As even Amar and Katyal concede, 
"when a racial plus looms so much larger than other diversity 
factors, an admissions scheme would, it seems, violate the let-
ter and spirit of Bakke."22 Such a concession, in passing, exposes 
the fallacy of Amar and Katyal's earlier claim that whatever 
"built-in stopping point" diversity may have, it is well outside 
the limits of Powell's ruling. 23 Likewise, it is now evident that 
Olivas' assurance that universities cannot afford to admit stu-
dents who can not do the work fails to justify current practices. 
Even if we accept his claim, "whoever can do the work" is sim-
ply not the standard that Justice Powell announced. 24 
III. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
It is useful to ask how these practices have come about. As 
Rosen observes: 
(T]he gap between the test scores of white and black candi-
dates is so stark that, to admit more than token numbers of 
minority candidates, race must be used not as a "plus factor" 
but as the decisive factor in case after case .... If racial "plus 
factors" are not allowed to loom larger than other proxies for 
diversity, if Bakke is rigorously applied, then the entering 
class at Texas might be onl~ slightly less white than a color 
blind system would produce. 5 
As the Piscataway Brief adds, "[t]he tiebreaker prefer-
21. O'Connor spoke to such a claim in the broadcasting license context: "[t]he 
Court's emphasis on the multifactor process should not be confused with the claim that 
the preference is in some sense a minor one. It is not." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 
630 (5-4 decision) (O'Connor J., dissenting). Professor Cohen also addresses this confu-
sion. See, Cohen, supra note 4, at 19. 
22. Amar & Katyal, supra note 5, at 1777 n.142. 
23. See id. 
24. Olivas' claim is a variant of the fallacy that race preferences are defensible so 
long as those preferred are "qualified" or "fully qualified' or "minimally qualified" 
rather than best qualified for the benefits being distributed. For a response to this fal-
lacy, see M. Carcieri, Ten Fallacies of the Affirmative Action Debate, 1 FLA. COASTAL 
L.J. 386, 390-392 (2000). 
25. Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 22, 1996, 
at 21, 25. 
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ence . . . would be highly inappropriate in university admis-
sions .... [M]ore than just tiebreaking is needed to get more 
than token minority representation in elite academic pro-
grams."26 As these comments suggest, mere token numbers of 
minorities are simply unacceptable to many university officials. 
Regardless of the limits Justice Powell imposed, his approval of 
the diversity rationale has become a justification to ensure 
proportional representation of minorities at elite public institu-
tions. The Supreme Court, however, has never recognized pro-
portional representation as a compelling state interest suffi-
cient to justify race preferences in the allocation of public 
benefits. In Metro Broadcasting, in fact, the O'Connor Four 
foresaw that the diversity rationale "might be used to jus-
tify . . . unconstrained racial preferences, linked to nothing 
more than proportional representation .... We cannot deem to 
be constitutionally adequate an interest that would support 
measures that amount to the core constitutional violation of 
outright racial balancing."27 As Roberts and Stratton have thus 
observed, "we are witnessing in the name of diversity the de-
velopment of a new constitutional right to proportional repre-
sentation by race."28 
The weakness of Dworkin's assurance that public univer-
sity officials are trustworthy since they are beholden to none of 
the communities benefiting from race preferences29 is thus now 
26. Charles Alan Wright, Douglas Laycock, & Samuel Issacharoff as Amici Cu-
riae in support of Respondent, Piscataway Township Bd. Of Educ. v. Taxman, F.3d 
1547 (3d. Cir. 1996), available at 1997 WL 626055 at 17 Westlaw (emphasis added). 
27. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 614 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Tho-
mas would almost certainly agree, establishing a sitting majority with this view. See, 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
More recently, the First Circuit in Wessmann, which was careful to distance 
itself from the Hopwood ruling that diversity is not a compelling state interest, was 
clear that proportional representation is likewise not a compelling state interest. See 
Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795-800. For other problems with proportional representation 
by race as a goal of social policy, see Martin D. Carcieri, Operational Need, Political Re-
ality, and Liberal Democracy: Two Suggested Amendments to Proposition 209-based 
Reforms, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 459, 497, n.151 (1999). 
28. P. ROBERTS & L. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE: HOW QUOTAS AND 
PRIVILEGE DESTROY DEMOCRACY 128 (1995). For an example of how proportional rep-
resentation by race and gender at prominent institutions is uncritically assumed to be 
a constitutionally permissible if not compelling goal of social policy, see David B. Op~ 
penheimer, Carcieri's Self-Described "Progressive" Critique of the ACLU on Proposition 
209: A "Conservative" Response," 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1153, 1170 (1999). For are-
sponse, see, Martin D. Carcieri, A Progressive Reply To Professor Oppenheimer on 
Proposition 209, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1105 (2000). 
29. See supra note 14. 
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clear. Perceived self interest comes in various forms, and jus-
tice is a powerful motivating idea. Thus, a combination of the 
perceived need to purge collective guilt and a vision of social 
justice as proportional representation are easily sufficient to 
motivate those in power to break the law. 
Once proportional representation of minorities at elite pub-
lic universities effectively becomes the goal, further, its 
achievement effectively requires de facto quotas. 30 Even the 
Brennan Four, who would have upheld the admissions program 
at issue in Bakke, conceded that, "[f]or purposes of constitu-
tional adjudication, there is no difference between [preferences 
and quotas] ."31 Regarding University of California at Irvine's 
more recent system of preferences, UC Irvine Chancellor Ralph 
Cicerone has admitted that, "I think it was coming close to 
leading us to a quota system."32 
Under the pressure to "get the numbers up," then, race has 
transformed from "one of many" factors into the decisive fac-
tor.33 The constitutionality of the process has been sacrificed for 
substantive political outcome. The end has come to justify the 
means, and we now have exactly what the Civil Rights Move-
ment was allegedly trying to move beyond, a racial spoils sys-
tem in the allocation of public benefits. 34 
Yet even if we grasp the dynamic at work, it is still impor-
tant to ask how universities could have escaped undetected for 
so long. Greve answers, "universities [have done] everything in 
their power to keep the data secret."35 Bloom adds that, "most 
racial preference programs are operated in complete secrecy, 
making it easy for the public to assume whatever it wants 
30. See DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: WHERE Do 
WE Go FROM HERE? 146-47 (1996). 
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
32. Quoted in A. Cohen, When the Field is Level, TIME, July 5, 1999 at 30, 32. 
33. Like "mission creep" in military operations, this might fairly be called "fac-
tor creep," and the analogy to wartime is compelling. In his dissent in Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting), Justice Jackson noted the 
drift from the allowance of a curfew order in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 
(1943) to the approval of an exclusion order in Korematsu. 
34. Two observations from a prominent civil rights leader are relevant here: 
"[T]he means we use must be as pure as the ends we seek." D. Ravitch & Abigal 
Thernstrom, eds., The Democracy Reader 192 (1992) (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Letter from Birmingham Jail); "[I]n an effort to achieve freedom ... we must not ... 
subvert ... justice. We must seek democracy and not the substitution of one tyranny 
for another." !d. at 191 (quoting Martin Luther King, Stride Toward Freedom). 
35. M. Greve, A River Runs Dry, Policy Review, April/May 1999, at 4. 
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about the degree and impact of the preferences."36 Even race 
preference advocates concede this. As the authors of the Pis-
cataway Brief admit, for example, "the higher education com-
munity ... interpreted Justice Powell's test to make constitu-
tionality depend on procedural mechanisms that conceal the 
actual working of the affirmative action plan."37 Bok and Bo-
wen's assurances that universities, operating in a "fishbowl," 
would not overreach even if they wanted to,3x are thus exposed 
as the obfuscation of a corrupt establishment. If admissions 
committees have been operating in a fishbowl, it is a fishbowl 
inside a locked room with no windows. As Sniderman and 
Carmines thus observe: 
There is an irony here. For the very criticism that is leveled at 
the "old boys" network for permitting established elites to 
conceal publicly indefensible choices under a veil of secrecy 
has still more force applied to affirmative action. The Achilles 
Heel of affirmative action, so far as it entails preferential 
treatment, is precisely that it entails adjudication of qualifi-
cations by a small, privile~ed social group operating so far as 
possible without scrutiny.3 
Yet there is even more. In spite of the measures designed to 
ensure secrecy, individuals have occasionally uncovered and at-
tempted to publicize evidence of such practices as color-coded 
application files. University authorities, in turn, have taken 
steps to retaliate against such whistleblowers. 411 Thus we have a 
vicious circle: abuse necessitates secrecy, which in turn enables 
and reinforces abuse. Standards are stretched, this is lied 
36. L. Bloom, supra note 4, at 66. As Professor Cohen observes, "documents in 
which university preferential admissions programs are detailed are commonly hidden, 
and as at the University of Michigan: "CONFIDENTIAL: INTERNAL USE ONLY." C. 
Cohen, supra note 4, at n.23. As Alt adds, "hiring and admissions processes are virtu-
ally closed to public inspection. As such, universities can commit such flagrant acts of 
color coding applicant files for years before the applicant becomes aware." Alt, supra 
note 14, at 187. 
37. Piscataway Brief, supra note 25, at 17. As Traub reports with respect to the 
University of California, "one prominent supporter of affirmative action says that the 
principle imperative of admissions departments in recent years has been 'opacity'." J. 
Traub, The Class of Prop. 209, NY TIMES MAGAZINE, May 2, 1999, at 76. 
38. See BOWEN AND BOK, supra note 4. 
39. P. SNIDERMAN & E. CARMINES, REACHING BEYOND RACE 55 (1997). 
40. See e.g., Georgetown Law Student Disciplined, Will Graduate, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., May 29, 1991, at A2; R. Wilson, Student's Article Rolls Georgetown U. 
Law Center, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., April 24, 1994, at A33; F. Robles, Conservative 
Law Student Brings Furor to Forefront, THE MIAMI HERALD, October 1, 1995, at lB. 
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about and the lies upon exposure are covered up. As Pell notes, 
accordingly, "it was not until state freedom of information laws 
were used to obtain admissions documents from state schools 
that it became clear just how far afield many schools had 
t d ,41 s raye . 
We now have a sense of the scope of the problem. It is not 
just that a Supreme Court opinion has been misconstrued. 
Rather, we have witnessed the profoundly antidemocratic spec-
tacle of unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats and academics 
secretly imposing their view of racial justice on society and 
then seeking to punish any exposure of the truth. 42 The process 
which purported to carry Justice Powell's ruling into effect has 
thus become indisputably corrupt. Powell was aware of this 
risk, and so was careful to insist that "constitutional limita-
tions protecting individual rights may not be disregarded."43 In 
his attempt to give universities appropriate discretion to pro-
mote diversity, however, he felt compelled to assume good faith 
on their part. While we can admire and sympathize with Jus-
tice Powell's confidence, this seems, in hindsight, to have been 
the great flaw of Bakke. Although Powell hoped for principle, 
what happened was politics, and the constitutional framers 
could have predicted this. In drafting the Constitution, Madi-
son, Hamilton and Adams did not assume good faith on the 
part of those exercising public power. 44 Rather, they designed a 
system in which those exercising such power, which includes 
the distribution of scarce, valuable public resources like seats 
at selective state universities, would be checked by others exer-
cising public power. In assuming good faith, Powell thus de-
parted from the assumptions about human nature that guided 
the framing of the Constitution, and the results are no longer a 
secret. 
41. T. Pell, Address at Hamilton College (Apr. 5, 1999). See also, Cohen, supra 
note 4. 
42. See Hall, supra note 4. See also, ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, LIVE NOT BY 
LIES, THE DEMOCRACY READER, 207 (Diane Ravitch & Abigal Theinstrom eds. 1992). 
43. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978). As Professor 
Cohen notes, "Powell was no simpleton. He realized well enough that the individual-
ized way of taking race into account for which he was making some room might be 
abused by unscrupulous administrators, transformed into systematic preference. Being 
an honorable man, he began with the presumption that others would act honorably as 
well." Cohen, supra note 4. 
44. See THE FEDERALIST Nos.l5, 65 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 51 (James Madi-
son); John Adams, The Prudent Constitutions of America, in THE PORTABLE 
CONSERVATIVE READER 51-64 (R. Kirk, ed., 1982). 
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IV. THE SOLUTION: FEDERAL JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF PUBLIC 
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
If we have clarified the problem, then what is the solution? 
One response, of course, for which there is ample justification, 
would be for the Court in an appropriate case simply to reaf-
firm the Hopwood ruling that educational diversity is not a 
compelling state interest. While this might happen, our prem-
ise is that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion should be upheld and 
enforced.45 After all, diversity is arguably consistent with First 
Amendment values, and constitutional law has always been at 
least as much a matter of the practical accommodation of con-
flicting interests as the reflection of perfectly coherent princi-
ples.46 So, let us take Bakke seriously, but ask, what are the 
wages of doing so? What are the implications of an honest at-
tempt to accommodate the individualist and diversity princi-
ples? 
For reasons considered above, we must begin with the 
premise that admissions committees cannot be trusted. There 
is no reason to assume that they will act in the good faith that 
Justice Powell presumed.47 In fact, there is every reason to ex-
pect otherwise. If the appropriate remedy for a closed process 
which has yielded unconstitutional abuse is to open it,48 then 
the logical consequence of taking Bakke seriously is suggested 
in the Piscataway Brief, drafted by faculty at "ground zero" of 
the affirmative action debate. 49 As they wrote, "[u]niversities 
could [operate] in ways that are readily administrable and ju-
dicially reviewable. ,,5o I therefore assert that taking Bakke seri-
45. Given the present Court's lack of any clear consensus on the issue, much 
may depend on the outcome of the 2000 national elections, which if any Justices retire 
soon thereafter, and who will be nominated to replace them. We know that the Senate 
is evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. The President will be forced to 
nominate moderates to fill any Supreme Court vacancies, and so there is no way to 
predict how any such nominees would rule on this issue. 
46. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. 
47. See id. 
48. As Dr. King observed, "[!]ike a boil that can never be cured so long as it is 
covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and 
light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of 
human conscience and the air of natural opinion before it can be cured." See King, su-
pra note 33, at 196. 
49. James Traub, Testing Texas, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 6, 1998, at 26. 
50. Piscataway Brief, supra note 25, at 17 (emphasis added). The authors sug-
gested this knowing there was a good chance that the Court would rule against the 
Piscataway Township. Since their only hope of salvaging affirmative action in any form 
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ously requires nothing less than federal judicial oversight of 
the admissions processes at those selective public universities 
wishing to use race preferences to advance educational diver-
sity.51 This proposal, of course, raises many questions. This art-
de concludes by identifying and speaking to several of them. 
V. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSE 
It might initially be objected that the proposal simply calls 
for more government, and in particular, more of the least de-
mocratic branch of government. I respond first, that it would be 
disingenuous for modern liberals like affirmative action propo-
nents to stand on the principle of minimal government. They 
obviously favor activist government when it advances their 
ends. In any case, since relatively few public universities are 
selective enough to need race preferences to advance race di-
versity, excessive governmental intervention is not being advo-
cated. 
Yet it will be insisted that Justice Powell himself rejected 
judicial oversight in this context. Instead, he stressed the im-
portance of the academic freedom of universities in selecting 
their student bodies, and commentators have underscored the 
value of such institutional autonomy. 52 As Loewy writes, 
was to suggest a solution that is fair and principled, and not merely partisan, this pro-
posal has the credibility of a statement against interest. 
51. This assumes, of course, that selective public universities will still want to 
use race preferences in admissions in the medium to long run, and this is far from cer-
tain. Beyond the influence of practices in post-Proposition 209 California, much may 
depend on the impact on other states of two pending legal developments in Florida. 
See, Cohen, supra note 4; Traub, supra note 49. One is the One Florida Initiative, Gov-
ernor Jeb Bush's executive order replacing race preferences in public university admis-
sions and race and gender preferences in public contracting and with race and gender 
neutral measures designed to ensure diversity. See, P. Douglas Filaroski, All Eyes on 
One Florida's Effect on Campaign, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, March 11, 2000, at Bl. The 
other is the success of the Florida Civil Rights Initiative (FCRI), a proposed state con-
stitutional amendment roughly modeled on California's Proposition 209. While the 
Florida Supreme Court ruled that the FCRI in its present form violates both the Con-
stitutional and statutory provisions governing citizens' ballot initiatives, and so could 
not be placed on the November 2000 ballot, FCRI sponsor Ward Connerly has vowed to 
redraft the FCRI and place it on the 2002 ballot. See T. Csar, Connerly Postpones 
Initiative on Race, FLORIDA TIMES- UNION, May 9, 2000, at AI. Nonetheless, some of 
the equal protection challenges mentioned above may be in the federal courts for a few 
years yet, perhaps prompting the Court to revisit the Bakke question for the first time 
in over twenty years. The question may thus remain relevant, if not burning, for at 
least a couple of years yet. 
52. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. 
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"[m]erit ... is ordinarily determined by institutional needs."53 
Malamud adds that, "(i)n the logic of capitalism, the needs of 
institutions, not individual desert, defines merit."54 As Bok and 
Bowen instruct us, universities have "much broader purposes 
than simply rewarding students who are thought to have 
worked especially hard."55 
I respond first that Powell at least contemplated judicial 
oversight where constitutional limits are disregarded. As he 
wrote, "[s]o long as the university proceeds on an individual-
ized basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference with the 
academic process."56 Beyond this, however, the argument from 
institutional autonomy simply begs the question. Even legisla-
tures in our system are subject to judicial review to ensure that 
they exercise the public power with which they have been en-
trusted consistently with the Constitution. A fortiori, the 
nonelected bureaucrats and academics on public university 
admissions committees are also properly subject to judicial 
oversight. In distributing scarce, valuable public resources like 
seats at selective public universities, they too exercise public 
power and the facts show that they cannot be trusted to do so 
in accordance with the constitution. Stressing that, "Constitu-
tional limitations ... may not be disregarded,"57 Justice Powell 
reminded us that public institutions in a democracy are not 
autonomous from the Constitution.58 Since the presumption of 
53. Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Bakke Seriously: Distinguishing Diversity From 
Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1492-93 
(1999). 
54. Malamud, supra note 4, at 1708. 
55. BOKAND BOWEN, supra note 4, at 277. 
56. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319, n. 53. 
57. /d. at 314. 
58. In fact, the claim that public universities should be free to employ race (or 
gender) as they see fit in the distribution of scarce, valuable goods is especially weak 
since the argument from institutional autonomy is largely invalid even in the private 
sector, which often has more legal autonomy in such matters. See, e.g., United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and Johnson v. Trans. Agency, Santa Clara 
County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Fifty years ago, businesses like law firms routinely told 
minorities and women, like Sandra Day O'Connor, that they were unhireable because 
of "institutional needs", i.e., their clients would not take a minority or female profes-
sional seriously. See, WILLIAM COHEN AND DAVID J. DANELSKI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 403 (4'h ed., 1997). Though some may favor a 
return to the days when the prerogatives of powerful institutions came first and the 
civil rights of individuals to equal treatment came second, the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
made such discrimination illegal. See, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e). The Equal Protection 
Clause, which likewise expressly protects individuals, demands no less. 
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good faith has been systematically betrayed, the condition un-
derlying the claim to institutional autonomy is not satisfied, 
and any autonomy rooted in the authority of Powell's opinion 
has been significantly forfeited. 59 
Yet it might still be objected that there is no need for con-
tinuing federal jurisdiction because organizations like The 
Center for Individual Rights, using the various freedom of in-
formation laws, will perform a "watchdog" function. Judicial in-
tervention would thus be unnecessary except on a case-by-case 
basis. Though he does not advance this particular argument, 
Professor Bloom has offered a proposal consistent with it. In 
his view, public universities wishing to rely on Bakke as au-
thority to use race preferences in admissions should regularly 
"publish sufficient data about the process to allow interested 
and affected constituencies to make an intelligent assessment 
ofwhat the institution is doing."60 
This is a sensible policy which would help make Bok and 
Bowen's "fishbowl theory"61 a reality. However, while it would 
certainly be a necessary component of taking Bakke seriously, 
it is not clear that it would be sufficient. In their documented 
zeal for proportional representation, admissions officials might 
well risk an unconstitutionally large gap in the objective quali-
fications of successful applicants from different racial and eth-
nic groups, gambling that the lack of automatic oversight, the 
cumbersome process of bringing a legal challenge, and the lim-
ited resources of groups like the CIR would effectively preserve 
the status quo. We must therefore be prepared to do more. 
Notwithstanding the existence of watchdog groups like the 
ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, after all, the fed-
eral courts properly retained jurisdiction over southern public 
school desegregation where ongoing constitutional violations by 
defiant public officials had been proven.62 If that process was 
important enough for continuing federal jurisdiction, there is 
no principled way to distinguish public affirmative action in 
this regard. Public education and unconstitutional race dis-
crimination are two of the most important concerns of any de-
59. Beyond this, the argument from institutional autonomy seems elitist inso-
far as any public university applicant whose family has paid taxes to support that uni-
versity is entitled to an admissions process consistent with the constitution. 
60. Bloom, supra note 9, at 67. For elaboration, see, nn.67-69. 
61. See BOWEN AND BOK, supra note 13. 
62. See Brown v. Board ofEduc. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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mocracy. Their intersection is especially worthy of close super-
vision. 
Yet it might still be claimed that the courts should stay out 
of the public university admissions process because powerful 
institutions have ways of achieving their ends regardless of at-
tempts to regulate them. Notwithstanding Justice Powell's con-
trolling opinion, the argument would proceed, institutional re-
sistance and inertia will ultimately win the day, and so we 
should simply accept this "reality." Bok and Bowen have ar-
gued along these lines, warning that, "it is very difficult to stop 
people from finding a path toward a goal in which they firmly 
believe."63 
While this seems to have the allure of realpolitik, an argu-
ment based on raw power is simply an abandonment of democ-
ratic principle. We are reduced to the claim that the Constitu-
tion should be obeyed except by those powerful institutions 
that do not wish to do so. Fortunately, such an argument did 
not ultimately prevail when public officials in the South re-
sisted the enforcement of civil rights like educational and vot-
ing access for minorities. In response to Bok and Bowen's claim 
that such officials have ways of doing what they want, Greve 
observes, "[t]rue enough; that is exactly why Southerners of an 
earlier generation discovered literacy tests."64 
It might still be objected that even if judicial oversight is 
theoretically justified, as a practical matter workable stan-
dards for such review could not be established. Any proposed 
standard, it is true, could be attacked as arbitrary. Yet if over-
sight is necessary for fidelity to Bakke, as I have argued, then 
we must simply do our best. Again, we know that we must cre-
ate a compromise that honors and accommodates both the indi-
vidualist and diversity principles, and so Issacharoff seems cor-
rect when he argues that the magnitude of preferences under 
Bakke must be "modest."65 As the Brief thus suggests, "the pref-
erence could be limited to one standard deviation or fraction of 
63. BOK & BOWEN, supra note 4, at 288. For slighty different reasons, Amar and 
Katyal also suggest simply throwing in the towel: since "admissions committees often 
inevitably know something about the race of an applicant ... it may make sense to 
permit [them] to consider what they know anyway." Amar & Katyal, supra note 5, at 
1773. 
64. Greve, supra note 34, at 4. 
65. Issacharoff, supra note 9, at 693-94. 
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a standard deviation, on the primary admissions predictor."66 
Thus, let us assume that public universities continue to use 
the SAT as one of their primary admissions indicators. 57 Even 
assuming a standard deviation of 5% at a university where the 
mean SAT score is 1300 for Caucasians and Asians (and 400 is 
the minimum possible SAT score), a 45 point differential be-
tween the mean scores of whites and Asians on the one hand 
and those of the minorities receiving preferences on the other 
would be the maximum allowed. If this still seems unfairly to 
"exclude" promising minorities, we must remember two things. 
First, 1255 would simply be the mean SAT score for all mem-
bers of the minority groups receiving a preference, so that for 
every minority admitted with a score of 1300, one could be ad-
mitted with a 1210. Second, a minority who scores, for exam-
ple, 1180 and is still rejected under this arrangement from his 
first choice university is hardly condemned to illiteracy. He will 
unquestionably be accepted elsewhere, where he will likely ex-
66. Piscataway Brief, supra note 25, at 17-18. 
67. It is sometimes objected that standardized test scores are illegitimate meas-
ures of potential. AB Chancellor Tien puts it, "merit can not be defined solely on the 
basis of grades and test scores." C. L. TIEN, A Personal Perspective on Affirmative Ac-
tion, Post and Rogin, supra note 9, at 379, 380. See also Olivas, supra note 9, at 1069-
80, 1118; Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming 
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996) at nn.68-69; Yxta Maya Murray, Merit 
Teaching, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1073, 1112 (1996). 
This is contested, however, and even some supporters of affirmative action 
concede some legitimacy to standardized tests. AB Issacharoff notes, "there is ample 
evidence of the usefulness of index scores in law school admissions in terms of predict-
ing at least first year performance." Issacharoff, supra note 65, at 676, fn. 16. Bok and 
Bowen admit that, "in helping selective institutions screen out applicants who seem 
unlikely to be able to complete the academic work, grades and scores are undoubtedly 
of critical importance." BOK & BOWEN, supra note 4, at 25 (emphasis added). Brest and 
Oshige also admit that criteria like standardized tests are fairly good predictors. Brest 
& Oshige, supra note 3, at 857. See also, Adrian Woolridge, A True Test, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 15, 1998, at 18; Volokh, supra note 4, at 2064 n.12; Tamala M. Ed-
wards, College Prep from Day One, TIME, July 5, 1999, at 32, 33. 
Even if standardized test scores are not perfect indicators of promise, it must 
be admitted that race is no better an indicator. Moreover, affirmative action propo-
nents' position cannot be that SAT and LSAT scores are completely subjective indica-
tors of excellence, for then they should have no difficulty with seats at Berkeley, Texas 
and Michigan going to the lowest scoring rather than the highest scoring minorities, 
and I have seen none of them admit this. 
Yet it may still be objected that some universities are considering the elimina-
tion of standardized test scores in their admissions processes, relying only on grades 
and extracurricular activities. I respond that it is not clear that this will be wide-
spread, but if it is, a similar formula to that suggested by the Piscataway Brief could be 
devised. The judges would simply look at whatever the admissions committees looked 
at in attempting to gauge applicant's objective skills. 
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eel. Furthermore, this will be true for those Whites or Asians 
displaced by preferred minorities who score below the mean for 
nonpreferred admittees at the first choice school. The assump-
tion that one must attend Berkeley or Virginia or Michigan to 
receive a good education and promising life prospects is un-
founded, and this illustrates why university admissions consti-
tute a relatively defensible context for the use of modest race 
preferences: the burdens imposed on nonminorities are not as 
severe as those imposed on them in the public employment or 
contracting contexts. Whereas good jobs and lucrative contracts 
are relatively scarce resources, there is no shortage of educa-
tional opportunities for students at the level of ability we are 
considering. 
This brings us full circle. It might finally be objected, as 
Rosen suggested, that Bakke's rigorous enforcement would 
yield only token numbers of minorities at top public universi-
ties.68 As a consequence, the argument would run, judicial over-
sight of the admissions processes at these institutions would 
undermine the advancement of the compelling state interest in 
educational diversity. 
Taking Bakke seriously, however, reveals that this is not 
the case. As Justice Powell wrote, "[t]he diversity that furthers 
a compelling state interest encompasses a ... broad ... array 
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic 
origin is but a single though important element."69 The assump-
tion that substantial diversity is impossible without propor-
tional representation of select races and ethnicities is thus 
without foundation in Bakke, and appropriately so. Not only 
does race not determine how one thinks, but there are perspec-
tive-forming obstacles like divorce, physical disability, early 
family death, and poverty that many minorities have never 
known yet which many whites have. Even to the extent that 
race and ethnicity are important (though not strictly necessary) 
elements in educational diversity, further, the rigorous judicial 
enforcement of Bakke would simply redistribute many minori-
ties to second- and third-tier institutions, promoting the diver-
sity associated with race there. Where this "cascading effect" 
occurs, as in post-Proposition 209 California,70 it is not clear, on 
68. See Rosen, supra note 24. 
69. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. 
70. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 30, and Traub, supra note 36, at 46. 
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balance, that anyone has been treated unjustly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have proposed the establishment of federal judicial over-
sight of the admissions processes at those selective public uni-
versities wishing to use race preferences to advance educa-
tional diversity under the authority of Bakke. Objections to this 
proposal on grounds that it has drawbacks amount to nothing 
conclusive. It is well documented, as we have seen, that consti-
tutional limits are frequently disregarded when the public uni-
versity admissions process is not effectively supervised. As an 
instance of checks and balances, judicial oversight of this proc-
ess would be consistent with the overall scheme of constitu-
tional democracy. 71 Even if the judges are inclined to defer to 
admissions committees' judgments, especially in close cases, 
the very fact that a relatively disinterested third party is look-
ing over the committees' shoulders should inspire them to take 
Bakke seriously. 
71. If one prefers to call our form of government a republic, Madison reminds us 
that a republican form of government is one in which all public power is derived di-
rectly or indirectly from the people. See MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 
43, at 241. 
